

Week 5 Notes

Introduction:

Looking back at last week, I situated Hegel's arguments in a tradition:

- I looked *backward* at Hegel's critique of Kant's intuition/concept distinction, as detailed motivation for his own immediate/mediated distinction.

To be sure, we are not going to appreciate this without Sellars and what we have since thought about demonstratives and indexicals.

- I looked *forward* at Hegel's alternative to the extensional-Tarskian order of explanation, which begins with *mere* differences of *objects*, by contrast to the modal-Hegelian order of explanation, which begins with *exclusive* differences of *properties*.

Shouldn't this constellation of ideas, this alternative approach, be part of the conversation in contemporary analytic metaphysics?

My own view is that it goes *way* deeper than, for instance, the distinction between goop/glop and basic particles—Russell's "bowl of jelly" vs. "bucket of shot".

One is not going to appreciate, for instance, the two points:

- a) Deixis and indexicality presuppose anaphora, in the sense that one can only have episodes/performances with deictic/indexical (token-reflexive, unrepeatable) significance if one *also* has some way of "preserving" or reappropriating, *repeating* the content of the original. This is *anaphora*.
- b) Hegel is offering a *converse* explanatory strategy to the extensional-Tarskian order of explanation.

Except *retrospectively*, from the point of view of what we now *know* and the distinctions we make, the questions we ask, what we have in general *learned since* he made those interventions.

These are conceptual achievements (intelligibility attainments) that are in principle only available *retrospectively*.

Picking these out and exploiting them is a large part of what I bring to the project of reading Hegel.

Part I: Force

1. Last week we left off after looking at Perception, Hegel's name for a form of empirical self-consciousness, a "shape of consciousness," a constellation of metaconcepts, or categorial structure that understands empirical knowing as grasp of sense universals. These are observable properties, ones we can come to know about noninferentially.

One of the principal lessons we learned was that this sense of "noninferential", noninferentiality of *origin*, observationality in the sense of making perceptual judgments by exercising RDRDs, should *not* be confused with, and does not entail noninferentiality of *content*. All concepts that have noninferential uses must also have inferential ones, if only as premises from which to draw further conclusions.

Further, we learned that ***implicit in our grasp of sense universals is knowledge of things that are not sense universals***, namely the objects that have observable properties, the particulars that exhibit sense universals. They are not observable in the same sense their properties are. We learn about them inferentially.

They are the first example of things that are known about inferentially.

They open the topic of inferential knowledge and the role of inference in knowledge. This is the form of empirical self-consciousness H, following Kant, calls "Understanding." The first topic will be things that can *only* be known inferentially: **theoretical objects**. "Force" stands in for theoretical objects in general, allegorically (or here, by synecdoche).

2. Progression from

i. Force and its expression. Only expression is observable.

ii. "Doubling" of forces. Soliciting and solicited force, since expression is the result of the interaction of the hidden things.

iii. The "play of forces". Nothing special about pairs of theoretical entities. Here it is a whole constellation of forces that results in any observable expression.

Holism concerning theoretical entities.

In the case at hand, the allegorical story itself is set in the conceptual framework of Newtonian physics as formulated by Roger Boscovitch and Kant. Roger Boscovitch, in his 1758 *Theoria philosophiae naturalis redacta ad unicam legem virium in natura existentium* (Theory of natural philosophy derived to the single law of forces which exist in nature), and Kant in his 1786 *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*. Hegel echoes Boscovitch's title within his allegory, in his discussion of the relation of the "single law" to disparate determinate laws.

The Boscovitchian allegory as it first shows up has at its center the distinction between *force* and its *expression*.

The reversal of the instrumentalist ontological commitment that has been implicit in the ways empirical consciousness can understand itself that have been canvassed so far. The observable expressions of unobservable forces show up as appearances mediating inferential epistemic access to the underlying reality that comprises the forces expressed. What the conception of force and its expression is allegorical for is a kind of theoretical realism that turns the prior view on its head, identifying the real as what underlies observable appearance, accessible only by making inferences from that appearance. Of this conception Hegel says: **“Our object is thus from now on the syllogism, which has for its extreme terms the inner of things and the understanding, and for its middle term has appearances.”** [PG 145] What is observable is demoted from being the real to being mere appearance that is inferentially revelatory of supersensible reality.

This identification of reality with theoretical entities is what Arthur Eddington famously endorsed in contrasting his two tables: the solid, colored, unmoving perceptible table of the manifest image and the constellation of colorless charged particles whizzing about at great speed in largely empty space that he calls the “scientific table.” His verdict on their relation is clear.

“I need not tell you that modern physics has by delicate test and remorseless logic assured me that my second scientific table is the only one which is really there—wherever ‘there’ may be.” The observable table is a mere appearance.

From Arthur Eddington’s 1927 Gifford Lectures, published as *The Nature of the Physical World* (New York: Macmillan, 1928), ix–x.

In this, what is the *inner true* . . . has come to be *for the understanding*; for the first time and from now on, there opens up over and above the *sensuous* (as the *appearing*) world a *supersensible* world (as the *true* world). [PG 144]

Sellars rejects what he calls the “Platonic principle,” according to which the most important distinctions of ontological kind (Being / Becoming) are to be marked off by our mode of epistemic access to them (intellect / sense).

Pluto, formerly known as a planet, was originally theoretically postulated, as a body of such-and-such a mass in such-and-such an orbit, to explain perturbations in the orbit of Neptune. It did not change ontological status when telescopes were developed that enabled observational, noninferential knowledge of it.

3. First position: invidious Eddingtonian scientific realism.

Because *force* is *not* observable, but must be inferred, from its *expression*, which is observable. Note two senses of Sellarsian realism:

- a) About theoretical entities, by contrast to instrumentalism. This is the point that the distinction between observable and purely theoretical entities (those that are, now, only accessible inferentially) should be understood as *methodological*, not *ontological*.
- b) Identifying what things are *in themselves*, what they *really* are, as opposed to what they are merely *for us*, or their *appearances*, with the best *theories* of (contemporary or ultimate) science.

4. Turn the observable-first view of SC and P, and the *instrumentalism* about theoretical entities it leads to once they are on the scene, on its head, to get its converse:
Invidious Eddingtonian scientific realism about theoretical entities.

What they have in common is:

lining up the appearance/reality distinction with the observable/theoretical distinction.

They just line them up conversely.

5. Lesson:

Distinction between observable/theoretical is **methodological, not ontological**.

Cf. Sellars's rejection of the "Platonic principle" that differences in our means of knowing things correspond to differences in the ontological kinds of things they are.

For Hegel, that comes out in understanding the "emergence of the second, new, true object" as a change of status, when what was *to* consciousness *reality* (what things are *in themselves*) show up *to* consciousness instead to have been *appearance* (what things are *for* consciousness). This is a methodological difference, a difference in status that the same *sort* of thing can have w/res to our knowing.

The assumption that the reality side of the reality/appearance distinction lines up with the unobservable side of the observable/unobservable (sensuously immediately accessible vs. inferentially mediately accessible) distinction, characteristic of the invidious theoretical realism of this first form of understanding consciousness is to be rejected, just as the identification of reality with the observable side, characteristic of sense-certainty and perceiving consciousness was rejected by understanding consciousness.

[Might mention here Paolo Camporese's observation that the *meaning* of the terms, and not just our *endorsement* of claims can change with new experience—at *both* levels: ground-level empirical concepts and philosophical metaconcepts.]

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reality with the observable side, characteristic of sense-certainty and perceiving consciousness was rejected by understanding consciousness.

Rejecting this view is treating *representings* (appearances) and *representeds* (reality) as at some level the *same kind of thing*. Hegel will claim that one kind of thing must be *graspable* or *intelligible* (sense-like), and he will parse that notion, following Kant, in terms of its *conceptual articulation*—being “thoroughly mediated,” in virtue of standing in relations of “determinate difference” (exclusive difference, contrariety) to other such things.

6. Discuss **holism** in connection with the *play of forces*.

Here “Holism and Idealism...” point about need for immediacy to individuate bearers of holistic significance. It cannot be “relations all the way down.” Put otherwise, one needs some things specifiable in another vocabulary to play the roles specified by Ramsifying a theory.

Part II: Law, Modality, and the Inverted World.

7. From force to law:

The Understanding, which is our object, finds itself in just this position, that the inner world has come into being for it, to begin with, only as the universal, still unfilled, *in-itself*. The play of Forces has merely this negative significance of being *in itself* nothing, and its only positive significance that of being the *mediating agency*, but outside of the Understanding... What is *immediate* for the Understanding is the play of Forces; but what is the *True* for it is the simple inner world. [PhG 148]

A number of lessons are taught by this first (three-phased) experience of understanding consciousness:

- the ontological legitimacy of merely inferentially accessible entities,
- the essential role played by actuality in filling out the modal structure of necessity and possibility that articulates determinately contentful states of affairs, and
- the need for a holistic conception of what it is to be determinately contentful.

The principal overarching form of the move being made, comprising these lessons, is however the transition from thinking in terms of force to thinking in terms of law.

This is a shift of focus, consonant with the holistic lesson, **from *relata* to the *relations*** that, it has been learned, functionally define and determine those *relata*. Instead of asking about the nature and ontological status of theoretical *entities*, in the sense of items that are only inferentially accessible, semantically and epistemically, to empirical consciousness, consciousness conceiving of itself as understanding now asks about the *relations* in virtue of which anything at all is inferentially accessible. These are relations of necessity, possibility, and impossibility that constrain and determine the actual interactions of thinkables: the determinately conceptually contentful states of affairs we think about.

I take it that one of the large lessons Hegel wants to teach us through the subsequent discussion in this chapter is that **it is a mistake to reify the laws**, that is, to think of them as constituting a supersensible world. To do that is to think of statements of law as functioning like ordinary ground-level empirical statements, as describing or representing some way the world is. To use that representational model is to think of statements of law as stating superfacts.

Hegel wants to move us beyond this *representational* semantic paradigm to an *expressive* one. Statements of law should be understood as making explicit something that is implicit already in ordinary empirical descriptions of how things are. What they make explicit are alethic modal

features of the conceptual articulation of objective empirical states of affairs in virtue of which they are the determinate states of affairs they are. The notion of representation has a place in this larger picture, but it is not the exclusive Procrustean semantic model to which all statements should be assimilated.

8. We realize that what matters about the “play of forces” is the *laws* that govern their interactions, and so hold the whole thing together. The forces are something like functional roles in the whole *law-governed system*. The laws are *implicit* in the “play of forces.”

9. The “second supersensible world” is then the “**calm realm of laws.**”

10. There is a characteristic initial mistake we can make about the status of those laws. This is **thinking of them as *superfacts*. This is thinking of them as something represented by our statements of law, in the same way, generically, as ground-level empirical facts (including theoretical ones) are represented by declarative sentences.**

Lesson: Laws are not superfacts, but implicit. (Sellars on description and subjunctive implication)

Laws and explanation. Traversing the moments.

11. Lesson: In fact, we should think about them as *implicit in* the play of forces, rather than as something else that interacts with the forces.

12. Hegel considers a final way in which the representational semantic model deployed by empirical consciousness conceiving itself as understanding can be applied to yield a construal of the relations between law and the world of empirical appearance (the “play of forces”). This is what he calls the “inverted world” [verkehrte Welt].

This is the third conception of a “supersensible world:” reified modalities.

According, then, to the law of this inverted world, what is *like* in the first world is *unlike* to itself...Expressed in **determinate** moments, this means that what in the law of the first world is sweet, in this inverted in-itself is sour, what in the former is black is, in the other, white. [PhG 158]

Note “determinate” concepts are the ground-level empirical ones.

The view being considered reifies the necessity-structured (lawfully related) possibilities that strongly contrast with actuality into another world, alongside the actual world. It is a supersensible world since unlike actuality, possibilities cannot be sensuously immediate, and so cannot even supply observationally delivered premises from which other merely possibles could be known inferentially.

13. The conception of the Inverted World seems crazy. And it is crazy for reasons Hegel himself has put forward in the previous chapter (*Perception*): The set of properties that are “opposites” of a given property, or even just contraries of it, are *always* mutually incompatible. That is why, as Aristotle argued, objects don’t have opposites. So the “inverted world” would be incoherent.

The picture is actually one according to which each actual state of affairs, each fact, is surrounded by a penumbra of merely possible, strongly contrasting states of affairs. (We can think here of Tractarian *Tatsache* surrounded by *Sachverhalte*. But unlike the Tractarian picture, in this one even at the most elementary level the surrounding *Sachverhalte* are not *merely* different, but *exclusively* different.) The merely possible states of affairs stand in relations of *necessary* exclusion and inclusion (consequence) to one another. One thing that was missing from the picture of perceiving consciousness is the privileging of *one* set of compossibles, as *actual*. After all, *many* (possible) objects are actual—but not all of them. What is being addressed here is the relation between actuality and necessity-structured possibility. We already saw that taking as a topic the relations between these two different modal registers is one of the characteristic advances of understanding consciousness over perceiving consciousness.

So far, so good. We can see the inverted world as a conception that combines a semantic point familiar from *Perception* with the concern, new to understanding consciousness, with the relations between actuality (empirical appearance, including what is epistemically available only inferentially), allegorized as the play of *forces*, on the one hand, and necessity-structured possibility—namely, the realm of *law*—on the other. The latter is reified, treated as a supraempirical world of merely possibles, which are thought of as represented by modally qualified statements in generically the same sort of way that actual facts are represented by ground-level empirical statements. But thinking of the merely possible states of affairs that render actual states of affairs determinate by strongly contrasting with them as constituting a *world* (albeit an “inverted” one) seems immediately to run afoul of another cardinal lesson we learned from the experience of perceiving consciousness. The facts that make up the actual world are *compossible*, materially compatible, *merely* (or “indifferently” Hegel’s “gleichgültig”), not exclusively, different from one another. That seems like a reasonable necessary condition of thinking of them as making up a *world*. By contrast, the states of affairs that exclusively differ from actual states of affairs are not compossible or compatible with one another. **Sour** is materially incompatible with **sweet**, but so is **bitter**. And **bitter** and **sour** are materially incompatible with each other. **White** is not the only contrary (the sense of “opposite” [entgegengesetzte] I am claiming is in play here) of **black**. **Red** and **green** are as well. The semantogenic *possibilia* that surround each actual fact like a cloud do not make up a *world* in the sense of a set of *compossible*, *compatible* states of affairs. The actual world, like any particular object, does not have an “opposite” in the sense of a contradictory, even though properties can.

The view being considered does not reify the necessity-structured (lawfully related) possibilities that strongly contrast with actuality into *another* “world,” alongside the actual world. The world as inverted is not itself a world. It is supersensible, because unlike actuality, possibilities cannot be sensuously immediate, and so cannot even supply observationally delivered premises from which other merely possibles could be known inferentially.

The view he is considering is **formally equivalent to contemporary possible-worlds** approaches to modality, epitomized by that of David Lewis. To see this, it will help to compare the possible-worlds (PW) framework with the inverted-world (IW) picture. In orthodox PW, we contrast the actual world as just *one* maximal compossible set of states of affairs, with other possible *worlds*, also conceived of as (or as determining / determined by) maximal compossible sets of states of affairs. The states of affairs of the actual world are made intelligible by situating them in a *universe* of other possible worlds. We can then understand an actual state of affairs in terms of the truth at the actual world of a proposition, construed as a set of possible worlds (interpreted as those in which that proposition is true). Determinateness of an actual state of affairs is a matter of partitioning the universe of possible worlds in which it is situated. One proposition entails another if the set of possible worlds in which the first holds is a subset of the set of worlds in which the other holds.

Two propositions (states of affairs) are materially incompatible just in case there is no possible world in which both are true. Contradictories are minimum incompatibles (propositions entailed by everything materially incompatible with what they are contradictories of).

Material incompatibilities of states of affairs (propositions) is encoded in what sets of states of affairs are taken to be genuinely compossible, i.e., to make up a genuinely possible world.

Exactly the same information is presented in Hegel’s IW, but packaged somewhat differently. Rather than contrasting the actual world with other possible *worlds*, each actual *state of affairs* is contrasted with all of the states of affairs that are incompatible with *it*. So what contrasts with the actual world, as a maximal set of compossible states of affairs, is rather the whole set of (noncompossible) nonfactual states of affairs. The IW is what you get by semantically associating with each state of affairs (to begin with, the actual ones) the set of all the states of affairs that stand in this relation of exclusive difference or material incompatibility, to it. Once the association of these semantic interpretants with each state of affairs is determined, we can compute all the compossible sets of those states of affairs.

What we do in PW is conversely to compute what is incompatible (noncompossible) with a given proposition (represented by a set of possible worlds) from the whole set of possible worlds, taken as settled in advance of the computation. The PW framework and the IW framework are formally equivalent.

We can start with the universe of possible worlds and compute material incompatibilities of states of affairs (propositions), construed as sets of possible worlds. Or we can start by associating with each state of affairs the set of all states of affairs that are materially incompatible with it and compute the sets of maximal compossible sets of states of affairs—that is, the possible worlds. Exactly the same information can be packaged in either way.

14. So Punchline: But in fact, properly understood, **this conception is equivalent to the notion of possible worlds**. It is just another way of packaging the same considerations.

And Hegel objects to *both* that it consists of thinking, now not of *laws*, but of *modalities*, *possibilities* and *necessities*, as *facts*, just located “jenseits”: in another ontological zip code.

The final form of “supersensible world” that Hegel considers is the “inverted world”—or, better, the world as inverted. This view is formally equivalent to contemporary possible-worlds semantics for modality.

Instead of seeing the actual world as surrounded by merely possible alternatives to it, Hegel considers each property of every object as surrounded by the contrary properties that define it by strongly contrasting with it. That is a way of associating with each state of affairs all the states of affairs that it excludes, in the sense of being incompatible with. As one can in the possible-worlds framework easily construct for each proposition (set of possible worlds) all the propositions incompatible with it, so one can in Hegel’s framework construct the maximal sets of compossible states of affairs (possible worlds) from the association with each state of affairs of its noncompossible states of affairs (a partition of states of affairs into those that are and those that are not compossible with the state of affairs in question).

German Idealism is principally distinguished from the empiricisms that dominated Anglophone philosophy (not always and everywhere—the Absolute Idealism of Bradley and Royce, and classical American Pragmatism remained true to their German Idealist ancestors) by its concern with *modality*: lawfulness and the subjunctive robustness of the *connections* between empirical descriptions (including theoretical ones).

15. But if **that view of modality as describing or representing a different sort of feature of the empirical world from facts—but in a sense recognizable as at least generically the same as the sense in which we describe and represent those facts**—is wrong, what is Hegel’s alternative (in 1806, remember)?

Part III: Explanation (and transition to *Self-Consciousness*)

Overall:

One big strand goes through:

Realizing that holism of play of forces depends on laws governing their interactions.

Law and explanation, Sellars on description-explanation, so implications and modality.

Critique of idea of extensional properties.

Objective idealism.

Transition to *SC*.

16. The crucial insight Hegel is offering, as I read him, is **that all objective empirical properties** (a class we have learned is not to be taken to be restricted to *observable* properties) **are modally involved**.

Asserting that they obtain always essentially involves committing oneself to subjunctive consequences, to what would, could, and could not happen *if* other states of affairs *were* to obtain.

The culprit here is the idea that there is a distinction between modally insulated and modally involved properties, and further that the former are antecedently intelligible independently of the latter.

This is the fundamental idea on which the Tarski-Quine extensional order of semantic explanation is based, and through it, the Lewis-Stalnaker possible-worlds picture of modality built on it.

This is what Hegel is prophetically, if proleptically criticizing under the rubric of the “inverted world.”

17. From the **idea of inversion**, which constitutes the essential nature of one aspect of the supersensible world, **we must eliminate the sensuous idea [Vorstellung] of fixing the differences in a different sustaining element**; and this absolute Notion of the difference must be presented and understood [darstellen und auffassen] purely as **inner** difference. . . .

Certainly, I put the “opposite” here, and the “other” of which it is the opposite there; the “opposite,” then, is on one side, is in and for itself without the “other.” But just because I have the “opposite” here in and for itself, it is the opposite of itself, **or it has, in fact, the “other” immediately present in it**. Thus the supersensible world, which is the inverted world, has at the same time overarched [übergriffen] the other world and has it within it; it is for itself the inverted world, i.e. the inversion of itself; it is itself and its opposite in one unity. Only thus is it **difference as inner difference**, or difference in its own self, **or difference as an infinity**. [PG 160]

18. **What is wrong with the inverted world [verkehrte Welt] is not the inversion, but the reification of it into a world—just as what was wrong with the conception of a supersensible “calm realm of laws” was the reification of laws into superfacts.**

In that case the mistake was to assimilate statements of laws to ordinary empirical statements, taking the former to represent something in the same sense in which the latter represent facts. The representational semantic paradigm of representings and represented (the name “Fido” and the dog Fido) is extended beyond ground-level empirical (but not necessarily observable) statements and states of affairs to include modal statements of necessity in the form of laws or of impossibility and necessity in the case of the inverted world. The difference between the two cases is diagnosed as a difference in the kind of state of affairs that is represented.

This is what Hegel means by the “sensuous representation fixing the differences in a different sustaining element.” The supersensible worlds are thought of as worlds that are just like the world of empirical facts—only supersensible.

Merely possible states of affairs (worlds) are thought of as just like the actual world—only merely possible. (Compare the boggling Cartesian response to Leibniz’s idea of “petites perceptions,” described as just like Cartesian episodes of conscious awareness—except “inconscient.” As though anything at all is left of a Cartesian *pensée* when awareness of it is subtracted.)

The inverted world is the result of inverting a world.

But the result of that is not a world. It is *the* world—the actual world, the only world, which is *partly* supersensible—as inverted.

“Inverting” the world is explicitly including in it the subjunctively robust relations of material incompatibility and consequence that properties and states of affairs must stand in to other properties and states of affairs in order to be the determinate properties and states of affairs they are—to have the conceptual contents they do.

Hegel is here laying down a marker: we are not to understand the relation of those concept-articulating relations and relata to the actual world on the model of *representation*, but on the model of *expression*.

They are in a sense yet to be specified *implicit in* the actual properties and states of affairs. We will eventually come to understand how representation and expression are two sides of one coin, two aspects of subjects’ relations to the objective world they know about and act on and in that both are established by and show up for consciousness in the course of the process that is its recollective rational reconstruction of its empirical experience. That lesson lies far ahead of us at this point in Hegel’s text. What we are given here is a quick sketch, the rendering of some outlines to be filled in and color added later.

19. Hegel is here diagnosing the mistake that Sellars calls “descriptivism.”

[O]nce the tautology “The world is described by descriptive concepts” is freed from the idea that the business of all non-logical concepts is to describe, the way is clear to an *ungrudging* recognition that many expressions which empiricists have relegated to second-class citizenship in discourse are not *inferior*, just *different*. [CDCM §79]

To be a descriptivist about a vocabulary or kind of discourse is to take its characteristic expressive role to be describing (representing) how things are. One should, of course, be a descriptivist about descriptive discourse. Hegel is rejecting descriptivism, or representationalism, for alethic modal discourse (which, as we have seen, is the approach characteristic of contemporary possible-worlds metaphysics for semantics).

The alternative he is recommending in place of descriptivism is a kind of *expressivism*. The image Hegel is working with in the preceding passage is that instead of picturing the exclusive contrasts in virtue of which actual states of affairs are the determinate states of affairs they are as further states of affairs, separated from the actual by being across some ontological boundary (“jenseits”), we picture them as *within* the actual, as *implicit in it*.

Alethic modal statements, about what is impossible (incompatible) or necessary express explicitly something that is implicit in ordinary descriptive statements about actuality. Part of what it is to be copper, a necessary feature of copper, is to be an electrical conductor. That excludes the possibility of being an electrical insulator. Those modal features of copper are internal to it, implicit in something’s being copper.

Thinking of them as facts about *another* world, a shadow world over and above the actual world is mislocating them. Modal claims, it is true, do not simply describe the actual. (Laws are not superfacts.) But that is not because they describe something *else*.

What we are doing in making modal claims is something other than describing.

We are making explicit something that is implicit in applying ordinary, ground-level concepts to describe how things actually are. Modal statements express the exclusive differences in virtue of which any actual state of affairs is the state of affairs it is. They articulate the conditions of determinate conceptual contentfulness of the ordinary empirical concepts deployed in description and explanation.

20. **Infinity, or this absolute unrest of pure self-movement, in which whatever is determined in one way or another, e.g. as being, is rather the opposite of that determinateness, this no doubt has been all along the soul of all that has gone before . . . but it is as “*explanation*” that it first freely stands forth.** [PG 163]

21. Have issue about the laws of how if the things they relate ($F=ma$) are *necessarily related* as the law says, they can be understood as *different* in the sense of not *defined by* one another and their relations?

H’s answer is to look at the use of *laws* in *explanation*.

This is what he calls “traversing the moments” by using subjunctively robust inferences to explain one description in terms of others. Can do this in any direction one likes. The terms are distinguished (separated) *temporally* in the course of using some as *premises* and deriving others as *conclusions*. This is (the bones of) a very sophisticated account of the *expressive* role of law-statements.

In the law of motion, e.g., it is necessary that motion be split up into time and space, or again, into distance and velocity. Thus, since motion is only the relation of these factors, it—the universal—is certainly divided *in its own self*. But now these parts, time and space, or distance and velocity, do not in themselves express this origin in a One; they are indifferent [gleichgültig] to one another, space is thought of as able to be without time, time without space, and distance at least without velocity...and thus are not related to one another through *their own essential nature*. [PhG 153]

His response begins with the idea that understanding the sense in which force and mass are distinct but necessarily related by Newton’s second law requires thinking about how statements of the law function in *explanation*, to begin with, in *inference*.

[T]he law is, on the one hand, the inner, *implicit* in-itself [Ansichseiende] being, but is, at the same time, inwardly differentiated...this inner difference still falls, to begin with, only within the Understanding, and it is not yet posited *in the thing itself*. It is, therefore, only its *own* necessity that is asserted by the Understanding; the difference, then, is posited by the Understanding in such a way that, at the same time, it is expressly stated that the difference is not a *difference belonging to the thing itself*. This necessity, which is merely verbal, is thus a recital of the moments constituting the cycle of the necessity. The moments are indeed distinguished, but, at the same time, their difference is expressly said to be *not* a difference of the thing itself, and consequently is immediately cancelled again. This process is called “explanation.” [Erklären] [PhG 154]

The claim that the objective pole of the intentional nexus cannot properly be understood apart from an understanding of the subjective pole, and so of the whole intentional nexus marks a decisive move in the direction of Hegel’s idealism.

22. *Objective idealism* asserts the reciprocal sense-dependence of concepts expressing the ontological structure of objective reality, concepts such as object, property, fact, and law, on the one hand, and concepts expressing framework-constituting features of norm-governed discursive activities, practices, or processes, such as referring, classifying, asserting, and inferring, on the other hand.

Objective idealism tells us we cannot understand the ontological structure of the objective world (its coming as law-governed facts about the properties of objects) except in terms that make essential reference to what subjects have to *do* in order to count as *taking* the world to have that structure—even though the world could have that structure in the absence of any subjects and their epistemic activities. The sort of unity-through-essential-difference that objective idealism attributes to conceptual contents by explaining how their objective (alethic nomological) and subjective (deontic normative) forms are related is fundamentally different from that grasped by understanding consciousness in its thought about force and its expression and force and law. Those both concerned only the objective pole of the intentional nexus: what is known or represented. Objective idealism concerns both poles, the relation between what things are objectively, or in themselves, and what they are subjectively, or for consciousness. And both of those conceptions of understanding consciousness concerned themselves with reference-dependence relations as well as sense-dependence relations. (That is part of what is wrong with reifying laws as superfacts. They are represented in a sense that is assimilated to the sense in which ordinary empirical facts—whether immediately observable or not—are represented.) So it is *not* the case that the relation of law to explanation and the distinctive kind of identity between its moments it involves should be thought of as *modeled on* those earlier relations and the kind of identity they involve. Rather, a kind of self-referential metaclaim is being made. It is only by understanding the kind of identity of content requiring diversity of form characteristic of the reciprocal sense-dependence of concepts articulating the structure of the objective represented world and concepts articulating the structure of the epistemic activity of representing subjects that one can understand the kind of identity constituted by the necessary relation of diverse moments characteristic of the objective pole of that intentional relation: the relation of force to its expression, the play of forces, and of both to the laws that govern them. (Or, of course, the subjective activity of epistemic subjects, but that direction in which the reciprocal sense-dependence can be exploited is hardly surprising or controversial.) That is the lesson of this experience of understanding consciousness.

23. The last five paragraphs of *Force and the Understanding* sketch the final shape of empirical consciousness conceiving itself as understanding, and the lessons we, the phenomenological consciousness, are to learn from the achievement of this form of phenomenal consciousness, as the culmination of the process of development of the others that have been rehearsed. The discussion is maddeningly compressed and telegraphic, both in its characterization of understanding conceiving itself under the concept of infinity, and in its account of how our understanding of that form of consciousness motivates turning our attention from consciousness to *self-consciousness*, in the sense of consciousness of ourselves as norm-governed beings. That is what motivates the first big expository transition in the book, from *Consciousness* to *Self-Consciousness*.

24. Bimodal hylomorphic conceptual realism tells us that in order to understand ourselves as describing and explaining, we will have to understand what is made explicit by normative

vocabulary. The activity of explaining empirical goings-on is an essentially norm-governed activity. Explaining, inferring, asserting, describing, referring, and predicating all involve both the exercise of authority and the undertaking of responsibility. The positions empirical consciousness takes up in judging or describing are normative stances: commitments. The moves empirical consciousness takes up in inferring or explaining (which functionally, and therefore holistically, confer contents on the positions) are normative moves: they are subject to normative assessment as moves the subject is entitled or committed to, according to standards set by what is a reason for and against what. So to follow out the lesson of understanding consciousness's aspiration to understand itself as a knower and describer, hence as a reasoner and explainer, *we* see (though it does not) that we must come to understand it as a normative subject: the subject of normative statuses.

Recap: 3 critical moves

- obs/theoretical \neq app/real. It is meth not ont,
- Laws not superfacts,
- World described in modal vocab not a different, additional world.

Then:

- positive expressive (explicitating) view,
- then step forward suggested by those insights: to SC.